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TOP SECRETANNEX B-2EXCERPTS FROM 18th MEETING OF USCIB HELD ON 8 JANUARY 1947

"...GENERAL VANDENBERG said that another problem had arisen which he believed advisable to discuss at this time in order to save time on the USCICC level and that is the authority of the Coordinator of Joint Operations. He made reference to the memorandum of 22 November 1946 from the Coordinator of Joint Operations to the Chairman, USCICC, and asked Captain Wenger to state the problem which had arisen.

CAPTAIN WENGER reported that the matter had arisen in connection with the memorandum which the Coordinator of Joint Operations had written to the Chairman of USCICC concerning priority problems and also in connection with statements made by Army members at the recent USCICC meeting during the discussion of the clandestine monitoring program. He said that the Army members had stated that the Coordinator had no directive power in the matter of assigning intercept tasks. As a result of this opinion expressed by the Army, which seemed to bear out the Army position as expressed in the Coordinator of Joint Operations' 22 November 1946 memorandum, he stated that he felt the subject should be discussed by USCIB in order to clarify the apparent divergent viewpoints between the Army and Navy.

CAPTAIN WENGER stated, that in response to a proposed Army plan for post-war coordination of Army-Navy C.I. activities, the Navy members of USCICC submitted an alternative proposal, dated 30 May 1945, which was submitted to USCICC on 13 June 1945. He said that during the discussions of the two proposals it had been revealed that the Army members desired that a single individual should be empowered to direct the joint projects, while the Navy members had favored a Coordinator rather than a Director. He said that the Navy members conceded the point and had agreed to a Coordinator with defined functions, and that as a result of the preliminary discussions, the paper entitled, "Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator of Joint Operations", dated 5 April 1946 and adopted by USCIB on 22 April 1946, resulted. He then read the following two paragraphs of that agreement:

Army, Navy and NSA
review(s) completed.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

"1. The Coordinator of Joint Operations shall function, as shown in Inclosure (A), under the control of STANCIB-STANCICC as executor of policies and directives formulated by STANCIB-STANCICC for the allocation of tasks for such intercept and processing capacities as may be made available for joint use by ASA and Op-20-G, and for coordination of all joint projects with other U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. The operating heads of ASA and Op-20-G will be responsible to the Coordinator for accomplishment of the tasks allocated by him.

"2. The Army will continue to be responsible for work on military and military attache systems and the Navy for work on naval and naval attache systems. Work on other systems will be a joint responsibility and shared accordingly. It is expected that a certain percentage of the intercept and processing capacities will be reserved and controlled entirely by ASA and Op-20-G respectively for the performance of the strictly military or naval tasks. The remaining capacities will be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator for accomplishing the other tasks as he may direct. In the utilization of the joint capacities thus made available to him to accomplish joint tasks directed by STANCIB-STANCICC, he shall be guided by the principle of (1) obtaining the maximum of intelligence in the minimum of time, (2) maintaining technical continuity, and (3) providing continued training of the personnel of both communication intelligence organizations on all types of communication intelligence problems. It is not required that all capacities allocated to the Coordinator necessarily be used on problems of joint interest. For example, it may become desirable for naval supplementary radio stations to intercept traffic of a purely military nature in which the Navy would have no interest other than furnishing assistance."

CAPTAIN WENGER stated that it is the view of the Navy members that these paragraphs are specific and the Navy considers the Coordinator of Joint Operations to have control of the facilities made available to him; but it appears the Army does not share this viewpoint. CAPTAIN WENGER then read the following memorandum:

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd)

"MEMORANDUM FOR COORDINATOR OF JOINT OPERATIONS, 24 October 1946

Subject: Priority Problems

Reference: Minutes of 33rd Meeting of USCICC

"1. In the course of the last meeting of USCICC, a discussion arose as to the handling of priority problems resulting from personnel shortages. One of the aspects considered was the shifting of personnel from [redacted] in view of the more promising prospects in these latter fields.

"2. It was recognized that the JPAG, with the assistance of representatives from the State, War and Navy Department, was already endeavoring to solve these problems on a working level. However, it was felt that possibly they were not being considered by this group on a broad enough basis. The members of USCICC agreed that efforts should be continued to solve the problems on a working level but that contemplated changes in priority which might require major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision. As one means of establishing priorities on a broad basis it was suggested that the requirements of the member organizations of USCIB might be resolved by means of special monthly meetings of their representatives.

"3. In accordance with a decision of the members of USCICC, the Chairman is submitting the foregoing remarks to you for information and comment.

/s/ J. N. Wenger
/t/ J. N. WENGER
Captain, USN"

He added that the question of priorities had been raised by the State Department representative on USCICC and then read the following reply to the above memorandum:

"MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USCICC

22 November 1946

SUBJECT: Priority Problems

"1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 October 1946, same subject as above, wherein it is stated that "contemplated changes in priority which might require major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision.

"2. The Joint Memorandum of 10 March 1945 signed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, authorizing

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd)

"the establishment of USCIB (then ANCIB) states in part, 'With respect to all matters pertaining to the collection, research, production, compilation, dissemination and security of communication intelligence, the Board will (a) Coordinate the plans and operations of the communication intelligence organizations of the Army and Navy.' (underscoring supplied.) This 'charter' memorandum does not establish USCIB as an authority competent to cut across Army or Navy command channels. Changes in priority and major shifts in emphasis are clearly a command responsibility. It is felt that, in the last analysis, such matters must necessarily remain a matter for decision within the War Department in the case of Supplementary Activities.

"3. Since no organization can properly perform its mission if the principle of unity of command is set aside, the Coordinator of Joint Operations cannot concur in the proposal that 'major shifts in emphasis should be referred to USCICC for decision'. The member agencies of USCICC are not equal partners in the conduct of communication intelligence operations. The War and Navy Departments, as the active agents, must reserve to themselves decisions which affect the actual conduct of operations.

/s/ Harold G. Hayes
/t/ HAROLD G. HAYES
Colonel, Signal Corps
Coordinator of Joint Operations"

CAPTAIN WENGER stated that since this reply seemed to agree with the opinion expressed by the Army during the discussion of [REDACTED] Monitoring program at the last USCICC meeting, the Navy members felt that the apparent divergence of viewpoints should be reconciled. He said that it had been agreed that the Army and Navy would retain a certain portion of their C.I. facilities for their own use, and that the remainder would be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator, but that the Army members now seem to disagree with this and to question the authority of USCIB. He said that the Navy members take the view that USCIB, as originally established, did not provide the direction desired by the Chief of Staff, Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, but that a subsequent exchange of correspondence between these officials extended the function of the Board and culminated in the Army-Navy C.I. coordination plan of 5 April 1946.

CAPTAIN WENGER then read the following excerpts from the minutes of the 11th STANCIB meeting of 15 February 1946:

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

"It is the intent of the proposed plan to retain complete Navy and Army responsibility for work on naval and military systems respectively. [redacted] activities will be considered a joint project and will come under the direction of the proposed Coordinator. He recommended that the basic proposal be accepted in principle by STANCIB and that General Corderman and Captain Wenger be directed to prepare the necessary details for its implementation and to make specific recommendations regarding the selection of a Coordinator."

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"As regards General Clarke's suggestion that the Coordinator and his staff might replace STANCICC, Admiral Stone indicated that, although the Coordinator should receive direction from STANCIB, it will be advisable to retain STANCICC as an advisory and coordinating body."

"General Vandenberg suggested that, in view of the above discussion, the proposed relationship between STANCICC, its subcommittees, and the Coordinator be left unchanged, but that the chart be redrafted to indicate that the Coordinator will be directly responsible to the Board. This could be accomplished by (1) placing STANCIB and STANCICC in the same box, or (2) adding a line of direct authority between STANCIB and the Coordinator. It was agreed that the latter should be effected."

"General Corderman pointed out that, prior to further consideration of details, STANCIB should indicate the extent to which the Coordinator will be authorized to act as a 'director' in behalf of the Board."

CAPTAIN WENGER concluded by stating that it was felt at the time, that the paper on "Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator" of 5 April 1946 was in agreement with the ideas expressed in the above excerpts.

GENERAL VANDENBERG commented that the basic question here seems to resolve itself into a definition of the word "coordination." He expressed his view that the Coordinator cannot coordinate unless he has directive power to coordinate, and asked for opinions from other members.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN requested that the problem be submitted to him in writing for study since he had not had an opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts involved.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that, briefly the facts are that, under the plan, the Army and the Navy placed at the disposal of the Coordinator certain C.I. facilities in accordance with the wishes of the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who, according to his understanding, wanted to derive the maximum benefit from the operations at Army Security Agency and Navy Communications Annex. It was agreed that the Army would retain a certain portion of its C.I. facilities for its own use and the Navy would do likewise. The remaining facilities of the Army and the Navy were to be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator of Joint Operations. He said that it now appears that when the Coordinator of Joint Operations attempts to "direct" he is told that he can recommend but cannot direct. He concluded by stating that when either the Army or the Navy does not abide by the provisions of the plan, the word "coordination" becomes an empty one.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that Navy had not questioned authority of the Coordinator of Joint Operations.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he was not alluding to specific instances but only outlining the broad problems.

ADMIRAL STONE stated his interpretation that the word "coordination" means control, and expressed the view that the Coordinator should not receive any interference from the Army or the Navy in carrying out his duties.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that the Coordinator should be free to handle those facilities which have been allotted to him, and asked the opinion of the other Board members as to whether this is a fair contention.

CAPTAIN WENGER said that he would like to point out that his comments were not by way of criticism but were merely an effort to obtain clarification.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if any real problems have arisen.

ADMIRAL STONE commented that the time is approaching when the Navy will take over the job of Coordinator and he would like to have the question of the Coordinator's authority fully decided and all doubt removed.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if the Coordinator has anything to do with those facilities which have not been declared for joint use.

ADMIRAL STONE replied that the Coordinator is concerned only with the facilities the Army and Navy have placed at his disposal.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

COLONEL HAYES stated that he would like to express the views of the incumbent Coordinator of Joint Operations. He said the present Coordinator wears two hats. He is in command of the Army Security Agency and he is also Coordinator of Joint Operations. He stated that he would frankly admit that the paper which outlines the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator goes further than he considers advisable. He said that the Chief, Army Security Agency, must retain complete control of the facilities and personnel of ASA.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes' opinion as to the difference between coordination and control.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he believed coordination would be the correct term for uses in describing discussions and considerations of what personnel and facilities are available and that the word "control" should be used to describe the authority to exercise command over those personnel and facilities.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked what can be done after the Coordinator of Joint Operations makes a decision, and added the question whether Colonel Hayes considered the Navy to be bound by the Coordinator of Joint Operations' orders.

COLONEL HAYES replied that the Navy should not be bound by such orders, but should exercise all executive control itself.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether this would include the situation where Army and Navy facilities have been turned over to the Coordinator of Joint Operations as excess.

COLONEL HAYES said that it is not correct to refer to those facilities of the Army and Navy which were placed at the disposal of the Coordinator as being in excess of the needs of the Army and Navy. Findings at this stage show no excess facilities or personnel. He went on to state that as Chief, Army Security Agency, he takes orders from the Director of Intelligence, WDGS.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if he felt that the Director of Intelligence rather than USCIB is his boss.

COLONEL HAYES replied in the affirmative and added that he must use the facilities at his disposal to perform missions assigned by the Director of Intelligence. He remarked that the discussion of this matter thus far sounds as though there has been a great deal of difficulty when actually there hasn't been. He said that allocations have been made in a most amicable fashion and that in some instances the Army is covering circuits of purely Navy interest and in others the Navy is copying traffic of interest only to the Army. He said that as Coordinator he had been very careful to avoid infringing upon Navy command prerogatives.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd)

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if this policy of being careful to avoid offending was considered by him to be in the best interest of the Joint effort.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he believed it to be since the friction which would likely result from any other course of action would not justify the possible benefit derived. He said that available facilities cannot be grouped into baskets with one basket for Army, one for Navy, and one at the disposal of the Coordinator because it is necessary to continuously take from one and add to another in order to meet a given daily situation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Colonel Hayes if he were now referring to tasks of a purely military nature.

COLONEL HAYES replied that he was speaking of the whole C.I. intercept field. He said that it is not possible to have a hard and fast allocation of these intercept facilities but the officers in charge of ASA and SA must be able to make shifts in allocation as the situation arises. If part of the facilities are in a pool, the above mentioned officers must have authority to withdraw certain facilities from the pool to meet a particular demand.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that, as Chairman, the comments which have been made thus far indicate to him a need for a full discussion of this problem because under the situation outlined by Colonel Hayes, both the State Department and FBI are shut out completely.

ADMIRAL STONE said that it is true that the Coordinator reports to USCIB but that when the Army-Navy C.I. Coordination Plan was established, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army relinquished to USCIB some of their command responsibility.

COLONEL HAYES disagreed and cited that portion of the USCIB Organizational Bulletin II which sets forth the authority for the existence of USCIB, namely, the joint memorandum signed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. He made particular reference to paragraph 2 of the joint memorandum which reads, "With respect to all matters pertaining to the collection, research, production, compilation, dissemination and security of communications intelligence, the Board will:

- (a) Coordinate the plans and operations of the communication organizations of the Army and Navy.
- (b) Formulate joint agreements as to procedures pertinent thereto.
- (c) Negotiate and coordinate with other intelligence organizations.

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COLONEL HAYES stated that the verbs used in these paragraphs indicate that no executive authority was extended but that USCIB would operate through the established command channels of the two services. He said that the Coordinator is therefore required to function through these established command channels, he added that this fact is borne out by the succeeding paragraph of the letter of authority which states in part - "The authority of the Board, outlined in paragraph 2, will be subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations." He remarked that this statement further restricts the authority of USCIB and clearly implies that normal command channels within the two services would be employed in the conduct of C.I. operations.

ADMIRAL STONE said that Colonel Hayes had spoken of there being no excess facilities but that he had understood that those facilities which had been placed at the disposal of the Coordinator by the Army and the Navy were to be considered as being in a common pool and that such facilities would be used as the Coordinator directed.

ADMIRAL STONE then cited a passage from the minutes of the STANCIB-STANCICC meeting of 15 February 1946 and commented that the authority of the Coordinator, as outlined therein, had been approved by all members at that time. He said that Colonel Hayes had performed well as Coordinator and that he would like to see the C.I. Coordination Plan continued.

COLONEL HAYES agreed that the paper on the Duties and Responsibilities of the Coordinator implies more authority than he thought existed or had attempted to exercise.

GENERAL VANDENBERG commented that this discussion has brought out both sides of the question for the information of General Chamberlin and added that General Chamberlin should be given an opportunity to express an opinion before the matter is referred to Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he was sorry the issue had arisen if there are no particular problems to be settled.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said there is a problem, namely that of priorities.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated he would like to have the situation reduced to writing.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested in view of the discussion that has been presented here, Captain Wenger prepare a brief of the entire situation to be presented to General Chamberlin for his consideration. He added that he thought the preparation of this brief should receive prompt attention.

ADMIRAL STONE said that he wanted to see the plan continued and that it can be made to work. He stated that, if the Army is entertaining any reservations,

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he thought General Chamberlin should look at the Coordinator's memorandum to the Chairman, USCICC of 22 November 1946, and consider the statements made therein on (1) equality of members, (2) cutting across command channels. He said that it is the Navy's view that all members of USCIB are equal in control and interest. He commented that he suspects there has been a misunderstanding with respect to "cutting across command channels" since it was not contemplated that Colonel Hayes, for example, would go direct to NCA and issue an order to a Seaman Second Class.

COLONEL HAYES said that if there were certain missions which the Navy desires to undertake with its own facilities, he doesn't feel that the Coordinator has the authority to interfere with the accomplishment of those missions.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that any difficulties encountered by the Coordinator in the performance of his duties would presumably be settled by referring the problem to USCIB.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that problems arising under the Coordination Plan should be handled the way they usually are under such joint arrangements, that is, through normal command channels of the respective organizations concerned.

COLONEL HAYES said that he would like to point out again that no problems have arisen.

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COMMANDER TAYLOR then cited the report of the Intercept and D/F Subcommittee [REDACTED] which had been discussed at the last USCICC meeting, and commented that the Army members had taken issue with the word "direction" where it appears in the recommendation "that there be established under the direction of JICG. . .," and had contended that the JICG has no directive authority.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that in all joint arrangements the directive authority stems from the command channel from within the respective services.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS said that in the "shift of priority emphasis" problem, the Intelligence Division is placing itself in the position of giving directives [REDACTED] that it was his view that such direction rests [REDACTED]

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COLONEL HAYES said that the statement implies that the exploitation of [REDACTED] is outside the military intelligence field.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that it was not outside military intelligence but was outside military operations.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

MR. EDDY said that the State Department has no complaint and hopes that the Coordinator of Joint Operations plan might continue as a working arrangement.

COLONEL HAYES remarked that the State Department representative through direct contact at ASA and SA expresses the interest of the State Department in priority matters.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he thought the State Department had experienced a difficulty in this respect in connection with [REDACTED]

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COLONEL CLARKE commented that, as regards priorities at ASA, if General Eisenhower directs that a certain shift be made, the facilities at ASA will be shifted to comply with the directive.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that if in making such a shift, the facilities allocated to the Army are used then this would be correct, but if other facilities are used, that is, those allocated to the Navy or to the "pool" then such procedure would be incorrect.

COLONEL CLARKE asked who, if not the respective services, determines the changes in allocation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that changes in allocation should be accomplished in consultation with the Coordinator of Joint Operations, otherwise he did not see how the plan would work. He said that if the Coordinator is not to be consulted, then there is no need for the USCIB-USCICC organization.

COLONEL CLARKE commented that USCIB-USCICC may have outlived its usefulness.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that we stay away from principles and just get the job done.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that difficulties had arisen on the lower level which must be settled.

ADMIRAL INGLIS then asked Colonel Clarke why USCIB might have outlived its usefulness and asked whether some other organization might do the job better.

COLONEL CLARKE stated that the purpose of USCIB was to "clean our skirts" in preparation for the negotiation [REDACTED]

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ADMIRAL INGLIS disagreed and COLONEL CLARKE cited the original correspondence which lead to the formalization of the USCIB-USCICC organization.

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ANNEX B-2 (Cont'd.)

CAPTAIN WENGER read excerpts from the minutes of early USCIB meetings to show that USCIB was also established for other purposes than negotiation

COLONEL HAYES stated that Colonel Clarke's position is correct in that one of the principal reasons for the formalization of USCIB was to present a united

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that this was certainly not the only reason.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this is not the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Army since without USCIB there would be unwarranted duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy.

COLONEL CLARKE said that, in the cryptanalytic field the service that would have intimate knowledge of a problem must work on that problem, therefore, there would be no unwarranted duplication between the Army and the Navy in the C.I. field.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked, how, in the absence of USCIB, would the Army or the Navy ascertain the interests of the State Department.

COLONEL CLARKE said that this would be handled as it had been before the inception of the USCIB-USCICC organization, that is, by direct consultation with the State Department.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN again requested that this entire problem be reduced to writing so that it could be studied.

ADMIRAL STONE said that he didn't think USCIB should be abolished and that the members should start thinking of the organization in light of the Eisenhower-Nimitz correspondence. He added that he would like to have the problem of the authority of the Coordinator fully discussed and settled.

MR. EDDY said that he would like to second this suggestion and that whatever the authority of the Coordinator is determined to be, he would regret any diminution of this joint C.I. effort and believed that USCIB should be continued.

DECISION: USCIB agreed that Captain Wenger will prepare a study of the evolution of the USCIB-USCICC organization and the Army-Navy C.I. Coordination Plan for presentation to General Chamberlin for his consideration. Further discussion of this item was deferred until the next meeting of USCIB."